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Abstract
In 1996, N. David Mermin proposed a set of desiderata for an understanding of
quantum mechanics, the “Ithaca Interpretation”. In 2012, Mermin became a public
advocate of QBism, an interpretation due to Christopher Fuchs and Rüdiger Schack.
Here, we evaluate QBism with respect to the Ithaca Interpretation’s six desiderata, in
the process also evaluating those desiderata themselves. This analysis reveals a genuine
distinction between QBism and the IIQM, but also a natural progression from one to
the other.
In 1996, N. David Mermin proposed the “Ithaca Interpretation of Quantum Mechan-
ics” [1]. Rather than a complete story about what quantum theory means, the IIQM was
intended to be a set of desiderata, a list of goals that a future interpretation of quantum me-
chanics should meet in order to be considered satisfactory. In 2012, Mermin became a public
advocate of QBism, an interpretation due to Christopher Fuchs and Rüdiger Schack [2–4].
This article evaluates QBism with respect to Mermin’s original six criteria. In four of the
six cases, QBism qualifies directly, and in the remaining two, a solid case can be made that
QBism satisfies the intuition behind the desideratum. From the viewpoint of QBism, each
of the Ithaca desiderata puts a finger on a legitimate and important question. What holds
the IIQM back is its insistence on allowing only a very limited kind of answer for some of
those questions.
QBism can be briefly defined as follows [5]:
An interpretation of quantum mechanics in which the ideas of agent and ex-
perience are fundamental. A “quantum measurement” is an act that an agent
performs on the external world. A “quantum state” is an agent’s encoding of her
own personal expectations for what she might experience as a consequence of her
actions. Moreover, each measurement outcome is a personal event, an experience
specific to the agent who incites it. Subjective judgments thus comprise much of
the quantum machinery, but the formalism of the theory establishes the standard
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to which agents should strive to hold their expectations, and that standard for
the relations among beliefs is as objective as any other physical theory.
This article was prompted by a paper of de Ronde, Fernández-Mouján and Massri which
claimed that “there is no interpretation more distant from Mermin’s original set of desiderata
than QBism” [6]. As the discussion to follow will hopefully make clear, this is untrue.
In what follows, we limit ourselves to brief quotations from Mermin’s prose, not just
because Mermin’s writing tends to make other physicists’ look flat and forgettable by com-
parison, but also because for the present purposes, it is not necessary to establish that the
interpretation of quantum mechanics is a significant issue. We take it as read that physi-
cists should be concerned with the topic — a claim perhaps more controversial than any
specific choice of interpretation. Thus, we proceed directly to Mermin’s six desiderata for
an adequate interpretation, which he summarizes as follows:
1. Is unambiguous about objective reality.
2. Uses no prior concept of measurement.
3. Applies to individual systems.
4. Applies to (small) isolated systems.
5. Satisfies generalized Einstein locality.
6. Rests on a prior concept of objective probability.
After posing these criteria, the IIQM paper then presents two technical theorems and
discusses their philosophical implications. The simplest approach is to address all of these
topics in order.
1 Objectivity
First, quoting Mermin:
A satisfactory interpretation should be unambiguous about what has objective
reality and what does not, and what is objectively real should be cleanly separated
from what is “known”.
When confronted with the question of which elements of the standard mathematical appa-
ratus of quantum theory correspond to objective reality and which do not, it is of course
logically possible to reply, “None are fully objective — all are at least tainted by the subjec-
tive.” This was the position of E. T. Jaynes [7]:
[O]ur present QM formalism is not purely epistemological; it is a peculiar mixture
describing in part realities of Nature, in part incomplete human information
about Nature — all scrambled up by Heisenberg and Bohr into an omelette that
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nobody has seen how to unscramble. Yet we think that the unscrambling is a
prerequisite for any further advance in basic physical theory. For, if we cannot
separate the subjective and objective aspects of the formalism, we cannot know
what we are talking about; it is just that simple.
Jaynes believed that to unscramble the Heisenberg–Bohr omelette, “we need to find a dif-
ferent formalism, isomorphic in some sense but based on different variables” [8].
QBism is unambiguous about what is “known” (or, to put it better, believed) and what
is objective. In particular, quantum states belong on the subjective side of the line, while
for any individual agent, her personal experiences are empirical and incontrovertible [9].
Moreover, in QBism the quantum formalism itself encodes a normative standard that any
agent should strive to attain. This standard is objective, even though the expectations
held by any individual agent are their own subjective belongings. But making this clear
requires a Jaynesian unscrambling: The textbook formalism, good as it is for so many
things, isn’t the best suited for resolving this question. (This should be no surprise. The
idea of a single picture of a theory that works equally well for all problems is antithetical to a
physicist’s training and lifestyle.) Fuchs and colleagues have identified a certain probabilistic
representation of the Born Rule as the cleanest statement of the objective normative standard
that quantum theory expresses [10].
Mermin goes on to say, “Indeed, knowledge should not enter at a fundamental level at
all.” In QBism, the term knowledge is deprecated, and belief or expectation are preferred:
The latter terminology carries less of a connotation that different agents must necessarily
come into agreement, as a matter of principle (though they may often do so in practice).
According to QBism, expectation is a fundamental part of quantum theory, which is different
from expectation (or “information” or “knowledge”) being a fundamental ingredient of reality
itself. Before there were agents, there was reality, but there were no expectations.
A useful comparison can be made to special relativity. Consider Einstein’s postulates,
and the dramatic tension between them: Inertial observers can come to agree upon the laws
of physics, but they cannot agree upon a standard of rest. These axioms are conveniently
expressed in terms of what agents can and cannot do, yet they are more than “mere” en-
gineering, because they apply to all agents. Or, to say it another way, any agent should
take heed of the theory when trying to realize their own aspirations. In QBism, the role of
quantum theory is analogous.
Most of Mermin’s writings on QBism have addressed how it gives meaning to the math-
ematical formalism of quantum physics. Other QBist authors have put more emphasis on
QBism as a project, that is, as a motivator for technical research [10,11]. (I myself fall into
this latter group [5, 12–15], since I have not yet attained that stage of a physicist’s career
where one can safely write papers that lack equations. Quantum foundations, properly un-
derstood, is not just about pretty words, but a matter of Sylow subgroups, Galois fields and
integral octonions [16–20].) What features of the natural world make quantum theory a good
calculus of expectations? What internally consistent alternatives to quantum theory can be
imagined, and how do they illuminate the particularities of quantum theory itself? In short,
to quote the title Mermin gave to his second paper on the IIQM [21], “What is quantum
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mechanics trying to tell us?” The project of QBism aims to answer exactly that, and the
first step is to “be unambiguous about what has objective reality and what does not”.
2 Measurement
On the second desideratum, quoting Mermin again:
The view that physics can offer nothing more than an algorithm telling you how to
get from a state preparation to the results of a measurement seems to me absurdly
anthropocentric; so does limiting what we can observe to what we can produce
(“state preparation” being one of the things you can do with a “measurement
apparatus”). Physics ought to describe the unobserved unprepared world. “We”
shouldn’t have to be there at all.
The QBist answer is twofold. First, QBism discards the limitation on “what we can observe”
— any action by an agent, interacting with the outside world, is in principle a quantum mea-
surement. In his second essay on the IIQM, Mermin argues that “the very much broader con-
cept of correlation ought to replace measurement in a serious formulation of what quantum
mechanics is all about” [21]. QBism does the job more directly by broadening the concept of
measurement itself. Any action taken by an agent upon the external world is, in principle, a
quantum measurement, and any experience incited by an action is a measurement outcome.
The supposed limitation of quantum theory’s validity to bench-top laboratory procedures
simply does not exist. Second, the fact that the theory resists cutting the agent out of it
is a statement about the character of the physical world. “We” don’t have to be here, but
the fact that this particular theory is helpful to us now that we are — that says something
about nature.
This item is the point of greatest divergence between QBism and the IIQM. (Mermin
quipped in 2012, “Like Barack Obama’s view of marriage, my thinking about quantum
foundations has evolved” [22].) From the QBist perspective, the IIQM reaches for objectivity
too soon, thereby missing its chance to hear what the theory is trying to say.
3 Individual and Isolated Systems
Mermin states, regarding his third criterion,
The theory should describe individual systems — not just ensembles.
QBism is fine with individual systems, because it adopts a school of probability theory
intended for single-shot situations. This is a healthy thing to do, even in classical science [23–
26].
Mermin elaborates as follows upon his fourth criterion:
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The theory should describe small isolated systems without having to invoke inter-
actions with anything external. [ . . . ] In particular I would like to have a quantum
mechanics that does not require the existence of a “classical domain”. Nor should
it rely on quantum gravity, or radiation escaping to infinity, or interactions with
an external environment for its conceptual validity. These complications may be
important for the practical matter of explaining why certain probabilities one
expects to be tiny are, in fact tiny. But it ought to be possible to deal with high
precision and no conceptual murkiness with small parts of the universe if they
are to high precision, isolated from the rest.
QBism nowhere demands the existence of a “classical domain”, nor does it rely on the other
kinds of dodges like radiation leaking away to infinity. It is of course capable of treating
the time evolution of an open quantum system as it is at handling any application of the
standard quantum formalism.
Mermin states his fifth criterion, an Einsteinian notion of locality, as follows.
Objectively real internal properties of an isolated individual system should not
change when something is done to another non-interacting system.
Fuchs, in particular, has used exactly this argument to make the case that quantum states
are subjective. The argument is essentially the reason Einstein gave for why quantum states
cannot be intrinsic “physical conditions” of systems [27]. Einstein wrote,
Consider a mechanical system constituted of two partial systems A and B which
have interaction with each other only during limited time. Let the ψ function be-
fore their interaction be given. Then the Schrödinger equation will furnish the ψ
function after their interaction has taken place. Let us now determine the physi-
cal condition of the partial system A as completely as possible by measurements.
Then the quantum mechanics allows us to determine the ψ function of the par-
tial system B from the measurements made, and from the ψ function of the total
system. This determination, however, gives a result which depends upon which
of the determining magnitudes specifying the condition of A has been measured
(for instance coordinates or momenta). Since there can be only one physical
condition of B after the interaction and which can reasonably not be considered
as dependent on the particular measurement we perform on the system A sep-
arated from B it may be concluded that the ψ function is not unambiguously
coordinated with the physical condition. This coordination of several ψ functions
with the same physical condition of system B shows again that the ψ function
cannot be interpreted as a (complete) description of a physical condition of a
unit system.
The QBist take on this simply replaces Einstein’s notion of probability for a personalist
Bayesian one, and lets go of the desire to complete the description using hidden variables.
(For further discussion, see [12, 28].) Plainly, QBism and the IIQM agree about Einstein
locality.
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4 Objective Probability versus Objective Indetermin-
ism
Mermin gives his sixth desideratum as the following:
It suffices (for now) to base the interpretation of quantum mechanics on the (yet
to be supplied) interpretation of objective probability.
In other words, “objective probability” is a rug under which as many problems as possible
are to be swept — a rug whose existence is not known, but hoped for. According to QBism,
no satisfactory interpretation of objective probability will ever be supplied. So, QBism is
definitely at odds with this desideratum. But Mermin himself began to doubt that “objective
probability” or “propensity” could be made a sensible idea, long before he adopted QBism.
As he wrote to Fuchs in January 2006 [29],
You persuaded me quite soon that “objective probability” was problematic. Until
I met you I had never taken the notion of subjective probability seriously, or even
known very much about it. While I’m still not convinced (sorry) that you’ve got
it right either, I’m much more aware that one of the pillars of the IIQM is much
more fragile than I thought.
In QBism, the numerical value of any probability is the personal property of the agent who
assigns it. However, the QBist world is one of objective, irreducible indeterminism. Physical
reality so overflows with richness that no notion of “propensity” can ever be adequate.
(For further discussion, see [10, §2.2] and [30, footnote 6].) The character of that deep
and thoroughgoing indeterminism implies conditions which any agent who uses probabilities
should strive to meet; we call those conditions quantum theory. Those looking for objectivity
in the numerical values of probabilities are just looking in the wrong place [12].
5 Theorems
After laying out the six Ithaca desiderata, Mermin discusses two technical theorems. The
first, which concerns the mulitplicity of pure-state decompositions of a general mixed state,
is often called the HJW theorem after Hughston, Jozsa and Wootters [31]. (The result has a
prior history going through Ochs [32], Jaynes [33] and Schrödinger [34], and caused at least
one statistical physicist to take strong issue with von Neumann [35].) Mermin uses this and
Einstein locality to argue that different decompositions of the same mixed state must be
physically equivalent:
If you take Desideratum (5) seriously, then there can be no more objective reality
to the different possible realizations of a density matrix, than there is to the
different possible ways of expanding a pure state in terms of different complete
orthonormal sets. [ . . . ] In the case of an individual system, the density matrix
must be a fundamental and irreducible objective property, whether or not it is a
pure state.
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We have here a good example of how QBism echoes the IIQM while at the same time con-
trasting with it. Mermin’s argument here becomes a statement entirely in line with QBism
when one performs the admittedly radical move of dropping the term “objective property”.
In QBism, any quantum state, mixed or pure, is simply a catalogue of an agent’s expec-
tations about what that agent might experience as a result of interacting with an external
system. Consequently, just as Mermin was aiming for, there is no category distinction in
QBism between rank-1 projectors and other density operators. The former simply enjoy the
additional property of being extremal in the set of valid catalogues of expectation. Both
QBism and the IIQM treat all quantum states on the same footing, but they differ on what
that footing must be.
The technical program pursued by Fuchs and colleagues underscores this point, empha-
sizing that any quantum state on a d-dimensional Hilbert space can be represented as a
probability distribution over the outcomes of a reference measurement [11–14, 36]. Thus,
pure states are not categorically different from mixed states, any more than, say, Gaussian
curves are from other probability distributions. In the simplest case, that of a single qubit,
an appropriate choice of reference measurement reveals that quantum state space (i.e., the
Bloch ball) is isomorphic to the set P of four-element probability vectors that satisfies
1
6 ≤
4∑
i=1
p(i)p′(i) ≤ 13 , ∀ p, p
′ ∈ P . (1)
Pure qubit states are exactly those that saturate the upper bound on their Euclidean norm
(which, equivalently, is a lower bound on their Rényi 2-entropy). The constraints become
more complicated in higher dimensions, but the principle remains the same [11–13].
Thus, we can observe a general prejudice in the community about which of the Ithaca
desiderata are the most valued. Interpretations of quantum mechanics often rush to excise
“measurement” from their vocabulary, but seldom to accord equal status to pure and mixed
states.
Mermin states the second theorem as follows.
Given a system S = S1 ⊕ S2 with density matrix W , then W is completely
determined by the values of trWA⊗B for an appropriate set of observable pairs
A,B, where A = A ⊗ 1 is an observable of subsystem S1 and B = 1 ⊗ B is an
observable of subsystem S2.
As Mermin shows, this is provable from the standard formalism of quantum mechanics [37,
38]. Since QBism is an interpretation of quantum mechanics, a way of investing the math-
ematics with meaning, this theorem is of course consistent with it. The result that, in
Mermin’s phrasing, “the correlations among all the subsystems completely determine the
density matrix for the composite system they make up” has come to be known as tomo-
graphic locality. Several approaches to reconstructing quantum theory from operational
principles have invoked this as a postulate; there, its main role is to distinguish the orthodox
quantum theory, with its complex Hilbert spaces, from its “foil theories” defined over real
and quaternionic algebras [39]. However, tomographic locality is not the only postulate that
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has been used in that role [15, 40–42]; nor has it played a major role in the QBist effort to
reconstruct quantum theory [13]. For further discussion of related technicalities, see [28, §5]
and [43], as well as [44, pp. 217–52, 499–500].
In the context of his original Ithaca desiderata, Mermin takes the meaning of the second
theorem to be that “the fundamental irreducible objective character of an individual system
is entirely specified by all the correlations among any particular set of the subsystems into
which it can be decomposed.” The slogan of the IIQM was correlations without correlata [21].
Later, Mermin wrote to Fuchs about difficulties with this idea [29].
Not unrelated to [the problem with “objective probability”], the notion of “corre-
lation” is not well defined, beyond my assertion that it means nothing more than
“joint distribution”. But what does it mean to say that joint distributions are fun-
damental, while conditional distributions, which can be constructed from joints,
have no physical meaning? And what are these joint distributions describing?
In an interview with Max Schlosshauer [45], Mermin said,
What led me to stop giving physics colloquia on the IIQM after only a year
was the obvious question: “Correlations between what?” Abner Shimony aptly
complained that the Ithaca Interpretation “had no foreign policy.”
Another reason why the technical side of QBism has placed less emphasis on these two
theorems than the IIQM did is that they are not strictly specific to quantum mechanics.
The Spekkens toy model, a theory defined explicitly in terms of local hidden variables, has
both the multiplicity of mixed-state decompositions and tomographic locality [46]. If the
slogan of the IIQM was correlations without correlata, then the motto of the Spekkens toy
model could be correlations with concealed correlata: The model has local hidden variables,
but the observer is constrained from ever having full knowledge about what values those
variables take. The Spekkens toy model reproduces many things first discovered in quantum
theory, such as teleportation and the no-cloning theorem, indicating that however intriguing
and useful these features might be in particular applications, they are not where the essence
of quantum theory lies. To find that, we have to dig deeper. Consequently, the theorems
that the IIQM had centered appear more peripheral — not insignificant, but secondary, to
be derived rather than assumed [13].
6 Conclusions
In summary, QBism meets four of the six Ithaca desiderata in a straightforward way, and
in a more subtle fashion, it addresses the underlying concerns of the other two. Of the two
theorems emphasized by Mermin’s original IIQM paper, QBism readily synergizes with the
first and has no quarrel with the second. The technical research done under the QBist banner
has placed less emphasis on that second theorem than the IIQM papers did, partly because
other mathematical statements seem capable of standing in the same place.
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The paper that prompted this commentary characterized QBism as “a neo-Bohrian, anti-
realist and instrumentalist account” of quantum mechanics [6]. Being both neo-Bohrian and
anti-realist would be a neat trick, since Bohr was a realist [47–49]. QBism is also realist —
it is simply not naïvely realist about any particular mathematical element of the quantum
formalism. It and Bohrian thought are two detectably distinct examples of participatory
realism [30, 50]. In fact, QBism has drawn as much upon the thinking of Einstein as upon
Bohr [51], a point that our discussion of the locality desideratum suggested. As Fuchs
declared [29], “When Einstein was right, he was really right!” QBism comes down in places
closer to Pauli than to Bohr, while remaining not completely satisfied with any of the
founders [10].
Whether “instrumentalism” has any meaning other than as a philosopher’s swear word,
we leave as an exercise to the interested reader. It seems, though, that characterizing QBism
as “instrumentalist” misses the animating force behind the interpretive effort: to take the
question “What is quantum mechanics trying to tell us?” as the impetus for new physics.
Directly identifying the surface-level elements of quantum theory’s mathematical formalism
with physical reality is an easy path to start down, but one that sooner, rather than later,
leads to confusion. The sought-after clarity recedes, leaving new vaguenesses to stand beside
the old. The ethos of QBism is to resist the lure of easy answers. As Schrödinger once
wrote [52],
In an honest search for knowledge you quite often have to abide by ignorance
for an indefinite period. Instead of filling a gap by guesswork, genuine science
prefers to put up with it; and this, not so much from conscientous scruples about
telling lies, as from the consideration that, however irksome the gap may be,
its obliteration by a fake removes the urge to seek after a tenable answer. So
efficiently may attention be diverted that the answer is missed even when, by
good luck, it comes close at hand. The steadfastness in standing up to a non
liquet, nay in appreciating it as a stimulus and a signpost to further quest, is a
natural and indispensable disposition in the mind of a scientist.
This research was supported by the John Templeton Foundation. The opinions expressed
in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
John Templeton Foundation.
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